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Black Sheep or Scapegoats? Implementable 
Monitoring Policies under Unobservable 
Levels of Misbehavior
Berno Buechel and Gerd Muehlheusser
ABSTRACT
An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. Thereby, it can observe the number of 
detected offenders but not the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent or the resulting level 
of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of 
monitoring policies. When several monitoring intensities lead to an observationally identical 
outcome, only the minimum of these is implementable, which can lead to underenforcement. A 
comparative-statics analysis reveals that increasing the punishment can undermine deterrence, 
since the maximal implementable monitoring intensity decreases. When the agent is strongly 
intrinsically motivated to curb crime, our results are mirrored, and only high monitoring inten-
sities are implementable. Then, higher monetary rewards for detections lead to a lower moni-
toring intensity and to a higher level of misbehavior.
1. INTRODUCTION
In many contexts of delegated monitoring, looking only at detection sta-
tistics need not be informative about the quality of monitoring. For ex-
ample, suppose a division head of a large company reports to corporate 
headquarters a low number of violations against some corporate code 
of conduct for his division (for example, compliance with certain ethical 
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or safety standards). Then, it is not obvious what this information re-
veals about the true level of misbehavior in the division. A low number of 
detections could result from a strict monitoring policy that leads to few 
offenders, most of which are detected (black sheep). Instead, the monitor-
ing policy could be lax, which leads to a large number of offenders, out 
of which only a few (scapegoats) are discovered. As a further example, in 
sports competitions it is hard for outsiders to judge what a given num-
ber of detected dopers reveals about the seriousness and intensity of an-
tidoping measures by the respective agencies and the virulence of doping 
among athletes. Further examples include offenses such as tax evasion, 
parking violations, prostitution, trafficking, and drug dealing, in which 
the number of detected offenders might not be very informative about the 
prevalence of an illegal activity.
The common feature of these examples is that an authority delegates 
the task of monitoring a population of individuals to an agent. Thereby, 
it is an outsider in the sense that it can neither observe the monitoring 
intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior.1 In 
contrast, the potential offenders have a good assessment of the proba-
bility of being detected, which is a standard assumption in the economic 
literature on enforcement (see, for example, Polinsky and Shavell 2007).2 
In this paper, we develop a simple model that captures the interaction 
among the authority, the monitoring agent, and potential offenders and 
that builds on the previous literature on private law enforcement with a 
monopolistic enforcer (see, for example, Becker and Stigler 1974; Landes 
and Posner 1975; Polinsky 1980; Besanko and Spulber 1989; Garoupa 
and Klerman 2002; Coşgel, Etkes, and Miceli 2011).
Some key features of our model can be foreshadowed with the fol-
lowing simple example. The enforcement effort of the monitoring agent 
(the inspector) translates into p, the probability that an offense is detected 
and punished. The number of offenses committed is decreasing in the ex-
pected punishment and, hence, decreasing in p for a given fine (T). For 
1. The feature that several monitoring intensities lead to the same number of detec-
tions also applies to many other settings such as education or loan audits. However, as 
discussed in Section 8, it is less clear in these contexts that the authority can be considered 
an outsider that has to rely on the number of reported detections only.
2. A similar informational structure is also considered in the model of Arlen (1994) in 
the context of corporate criminal liability. Moreover, as for the case of street prostitution, 
regular market participants might (correctly) perceive the actual threat of being arrested 
by the police (let alone convicted) to be much smaller than might be presumed by outsid-
ers (see, for example, Levitt and Venkatesh 2007).
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Figure 1. Crime level and number of detections as a function of detection probability p 
for two fine levels.
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instance, Figure 1 depicts the number of offenses as a linear function F(p, 
T) = 1 - pT for fine levels T = 1 and T = 2.3 Figure 1 also depicts the 
number of detections pF(p, T) for each case (dashed curves).
The example is helpful in illustrating the main contributions of our 
paper compared with the existing strands of literature on law enforce-
ment and on delegated monitoring. First, we strengthen the argument al-
ready provided in Polinsky (1980) that high monitoring intensities might 
not be implementable because enforcers anticipate that strong deterrence 
reduces revenues. In particular, we provide a full characterization of im-
plementable monitoring policies. Thus, we do not confine attention only 
to a particular monitoring policy that, for instance, maximizes social wel-
fare (see, for example, Polinsky 1980) or some other objective function 
of the authority (Garoupa and Klerman 2002). Intuitively, in Figure 1, 
for every monitoring intensity that corresponds to the decreasing part of 
the detection function there exists another one on the increasing part that 
gives rise to the same number of detected offenses and is hence observa-
tionally identical for an outside observer. However, the inspector prefers 
the lower of the monitoring intensities, as it involves less enforcement ef-
fort (thereby leading to more offenses), so that the largest monitoring in-
tensity that can be implemented is pm, where the number of detections is 
maximum. More generally, when several monitoring intensities give rise 
to the same number of detected offenses, then the agent can be induced to 
choose only the minimum of these.4 For this reason, under quite general 
conditions (for example, with respect to the underlying distribution of 
individuals’ gains from the offense or the agent’s effort cost function), a 
large set of monitoring policies cannot be implemented by the authority, 
even if it has unlimited funds to reward the inspector. This puts a lower 
bound on the number of offenses that can be achieved in this setup and 
can result in underenforcement compared with an efficiency benchmark.
Second, to evaluate the scope of this result, we perform a comparative- 
statics analysis with respect to both the distribution of gains from crime 
(where the previous literature has usually confined attention to the uni-
form case only) and the fine for detected offenders. Our results point to 
a novel trade-off between the severity of the punishment and the set of 
3. As will become clear, linear crime functions arise when the distribution of the gains 
from the crime is uniform.
4. In Ichino and Muehlheusser (2008), a low monitoring intensity results as an opti-
mal choice of the inspector, as this allows him to elicit private information from (poten-
tial) offenders.
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implementable monitoring intensities: on the one hand, when the punish-
ment is relatively strong (for example, because there are not many indi-
viduals with sufficiently large gains from the offense or because the fine 
is high), then the crime level tends to be low for any given monitoring 
intensity p. But on the other hand, the set of implementable monitoring 
intensities is small. In Figure 1 this trade-off can be seen by comparing 
the two graphs. The higher fine results in a lower number of offenses for 
any given monitoring intensity, but it also reduces the maximal imple-
mentable monitoring policy. In this example, the two effects just offset 
each other so that the minimal number of offenses F(pm(T), T) is the same 
for both fine levels (and equal to .5), but we also show that the latter ef-
fect may dominate, so that deterrence may in fact decrease as the punish-
ment becomes more severe.
This result is in contrast to the standard approach in the enforcement 
literature in the tradition of Becker (1968), where the two components of 
expected punishment—the probability of detection and the fine—can be 
set independently from each other. As a consequence, higher fines typi-
cally lead to more deterrence.5 Moreover, the literature provides various 
reasons against Becker’s stark conclusion that fines should be set as large 
as possible. Examples include offenders who are risk averse or hetero-
geneous with respect to their wealth, offenders who engage in socially 
undesirable avoidance activities, costs of fine collection, or the require-
ment that the punishment should reflect the severity of the offense (for a 
detailed discussion, see Polinsky and Shavell 2007). But in these frame-
works, higher fines would also always lead to more deterrence. In con-
trast, our result suggests that in the context of delegated monitoring, even 
in the absence of all of these countervailing factors, optimal fines might 
not be too large because of the potentially detrimental effect on deter-
rence.6 Importantly, the potentially inverse relationship between the se-
verity of punishment and deterrence is not driven by behavioral biases or 
irrationality, for example, on the side of the offenders. Finally, the novel 
trade-off identified in our framework might also add to the difficulty of 
the empirical literature in providing robust evidence in favor of Becker’s 
5. One exception is the model of Nussim and Tabbach (2009), in which in addition to 
the decision about their level of criminal behavior, offenders can engage in avoidance ac-
tivities. Further exceptions include frameworks of juror behavior (Andreoni 1991; Feess 
and Wohlschlegel 2009), inspection games (Tsebelis 1990), and corruption (Kugler, Verd-
ier, and Zenou 2005).
6. Note that this issue cannot be mitigated by replacing fines with imprisonment be-
cause our argument holds for any type of punishment.
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deterrence hypothesis, apart from the well-known methodological issues 
(see, for example, Levitt 1997; Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004; Levitt 
and Miles 2007).
Third, we consider an extension of the model in which we allow the 
inspector to be crime sensitive in the sense that she directly benefits or 
suffers from criminal activity. In this respect, a disutility from crime can 
be naturally interpreted as resulting from intrinsic motivation to keep the 
crime level low.7 We show first that when the agent’s degree of intrin-
sic motivation is not too high, then, as in the baseline model, only rela-
tively low monitoring intensities can be implemented (which leads again 
to the same lower bound for the resulting crime level). In contrast, when 
the agent is strongly motivated to curb crime, a mirror results holds, and 
only relatively high monitoring intensities can be implemented. In Fig-
ure  1, these implementable sets are given by the monitoring intensities 
that correspond to the increasing and decreasing parts of the detection 
function. This gives rise to the possibility of overenforcement, which has 
so far not been addressed in the literature on monopolistic enforcement 
(see, for example, Polinsky 1980; Garoupa and Klerman 2002; Coşgel, 
Etkes, and Miceli 2011).8 However, it might occur in cases in which the 
harm from the offense is small or the offender’s cost of not committing 
it is large. One example in this respect would be minor parking offenses 
that are fully deterred by an overly motivated agent. Moreover, intrinsic 
motivation to keep the number of offenses low yields an explanation for 
the phenomenon that there are (so many) inspectors who do monitor in-
tensely, even if they would not suffer any material losses in case of shirk-
ing.
Fourth, depending on their degree of intrinsic motivation, agents re-
act quite differently to incentive schemes, such as bounties for detected 
offenders, which are often analyzed in the literature (see, for example, 
Becker and Stigler 1974; Landes and Posner 1975; Polinsky 1980; Be-
sanko and Spulber 1989; Garoupa and Klerman 2002; Coşgel, Etkes, 
7. In contrast, the previous literature only considers indirect ways to induce the agent 
to internalize the effect of her monitoring choice on the resulting crime level. For exam-
ple, Garoupa and Klerman (2002, p. 131) discuss penalties for the agent that are increas-
ing in the number of offenses but would require the latter to be observable and verifiable. 
Consequently, instead of imposing penalties, Coşgel, Etkes, and Miceli (2011) argue in 
favor of allowing the monitoring agent to also collect income taxes (which are higher, the 
lower the level of crime).
8. In Landes and Posner (1975), overinvestment arises when there is a perfectly com-
petitive market for private enforcement.
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and Miceli 2011). Intuitively, agents will generate more detections when 
they are rewarded for doing so independent of their intrinsic motivation. 
However, as the number of detections is generally nonmonotonic in p 
(as in Figure 1), it depends on whether the inspector’s optimal choice is 
in the increasing or in the decreasing part of the detection function. For 
agents with weak intrinsic motivation, the increasing part is relevant such 
that a higher per-detection reward indeed induces them to increase their 
monitoring effort. In contrast, optimal monitoring intensities of agents 
with strong intrinsic motivation are in the decreasing part of the detec-
tion function, so that they will reduce their effort, thereby also inducing 
a higher crime level. This latter result is similar to a crowding-out ef-
fect (see, for example, Deci 1971; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999; Frey 
and Jegen 2001; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011), but notice that here 
monetary rewards do not directly impinge on the intrinsic motivation of 
the agent, for example, in the sense of transforming a noneconomic re-
lationship into an economic one (Titmuss 1970; Gneezy and Rustichini 
2000a, 2000b). Rather, they simply introduce an incentive to generate 
more detections, which, for agents with a strong intrinsic motivation, re-
quires a lower monitoring effort. Our analysis suggests a beneficial role of 
intrinsic motivation in remedying the problem of underenforcement, but 
it also reveals the importance of distinguishing between different types of 
enforcers in order to avoid severely misguided incentives.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We first set up the 
baseline framework in Section 2, characterize implementable monitoring 
intensities (Section 3), and discuss some comparative-statics properties 
(Section 4). In Section 5, we study the case of a crime-sensitive inspec-
tor. Section 6 considers linear reward schemes (bounties), while Section 
7 compares our results concerning implementability with an efficiency 
benchmark. Finally, Section 8 discusses some implications from our anal-
ysis and concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2. MODEL
There are three types of players: a population of individuals who are po-
tential offenders, an inspector who monitors them, and an outside gov-
ernor who incentivizes the inspector. We examine each of these in turn.
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2.1. Individuals
There is a unit mass of individuals who differ with respect to their 
gains from committing an offense, gi, which are distributed according 
to a twice continuously differentiable cumulative distribution function 
®: [0, 1].G  Following the tradition of Becker (1968), for a given 
probability of detection p ∈ [0, 1] and the (exogenous) penalty T > 0, 
each individual will commit the offense if and only if its gain gi exceeds 
the expected costs pT. This yields a threshold =:g pT  such that all indi-
viduals satisfying >ig g  £( )ig g  will (not) commit the offense, which 
leads to a fraction of offenders F(p) := 1 - G(pT). We assume that the 
distribution of the gains from the offense has full support on [0, T ] such 
that F(p) is strictly decreasing.9
2.2. Inspector
The inspector chooses the monitoring intensity p ∈ [0, 1] that equals 
the probability that each offender is detected.10 Monitoring is costly for 
the inspector and is captured by a strictly increasing cost function C(p). 
Taking into account the optimal behavior of individuals as characterized 
above, a monitoring intensity p gives rise to a number of detected of-
fenders D(p) := pF(p). Denote by Δ ⊆ [0, 1] the image of D(p)—that is, 
Δ := {d | d = D(p) for some p ∈ [0, 1]}—and denote by pm the smallest 
monitoring intensity for which the number of detections is maximal. In 
special cases, this occurs at the upper boundary (pm = 1); otherwise, pm is 
characterized by the first-order condition D′(pm) = 0.
We study a context in which the inspector can be rewarded only on 
the basis of the number of detections D(p), which is observable. Denoting 
the monetary reward R[D(p)], the inspector’s payoff is11
 = -( ) [ ( )] ( ).u p R D p C p  (1)
9. Note that this assumption does not rule out the possibility that there exist individ-
uals with gi < 0 or gi > T. It, however, excludes cases in which the number of offenses 
F(p) reaches 0 for monitoring intensities p < 1 (as in Figure 1B). These cases could also be 
included in the general analysis of the model, but this would only add notational inconve-
nience without qualitatively affecting the results.
10. Alternatively, one could explicitly model the inspector’s effort to affect the prob-
ability of detection through some (increasing) function. Under standard assumptions (for 
example, Inada conditions), while adding notation, this approach would not affect our 
results qualitatively.
11. Additive separability of rewards and costs is assumed for analytical convenience 
only. The assumption that the inspector’s utility is not directly affected by the crime level 
F(p) is relaxed in Section 5.
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2.3. Governor
The governor remunerates the inspector by setting a payment scheme 
R[D(p)] without being able to verify the inspector’s behavior (p) or the 
crime level (F(p)).12 In the main part of the text, it is not necessary to 
specify explicitly the preferences of the governor, for example, with re-
gard to her distaste for crime. Rather, we assume that the governor aims 
to implement some desired monitoring intensity Î [0 .ˆ , 1]p  For instance, 
pˆ could indeed be her privately optimal choice, or, alternatively, it could 
arise from a social welfare function. This latter case is discussed in Sec-
tion 7.
3. IMPLEMENTABLE MONITORING POLICIES
We now analyze under which circumstances the governor can success-
fully induce the inspector to choose ,pˆ  that is, find payments R such that 
Îˆ argmax ( ).pp u p  For any given level of detections d ∈ ∆, define an or-
dered set of monitoring intensities (Pd, <) such that each Îd dlp P  satisfies 
=)( .dlD p d  Importantly, while the number of detected offenses is equal 
to d for all Î ,d dlp P  the underlying crime level is decreasing in l, while 
the inspector’s effort costs are increasing in l; that is, for all l = 1, 2, . . . , 
we have +³ 1( ) ( )
d d
l lF p F p  and +< 1( ) ( ).
d d
l lC p C p  Denote by P1 the set con-
taining all minimum monitoring intensities; that is, = =1 1{ |
dP p p p  for 
some d ∈ ∆}.
Theorem 1. A desired monitoring policy pˆ  is implementable if and 
only if Î 1ˆ .p P  The resulting set of implementable monitoring policies P1 
satisfies P1 ⊆ [0, pm] such that the induced number of offenses is at least 
F(pm).
The result is shown in Figure 2. In special cases there is a unique mon-
itoring intensity associated with a given number of (observable) detec-
tions.13 Otherwise, when Pd is not a singleton, the inspector has a choice 
between several monitoring regimes in order to generate d detections. For 
example, he can choose a low level of monitoring effort 1
dp  (at low cost), 
which leads to a relatively high number of offenders, out of which d are 
12. See Arlen (1994), Garoupa and Klerman (2002), and Coşgel, Etkes, and Miceli 
(2011) for similar assumptions concerning the governor’s role as an outsider in the sense 
of lacking these crucial pieces of information.
13. In the example in Figure 2, this is true for the global maximum D(pm) and when 
the number of detections is very small.
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detected (scapegoats). Alternatively, the inspector can choose a higher 
level of effort >2 1
d dp p  (at higher cost), which leads to fewer offenses but 
again to d detections (black sheep). Since the governor can observe only 
the number of detections but not the chosen monitoring intensity, these 
two choices of effort are observationally identical from the governor’s 
point of view. As the inspector’s payment is the same for all Îd dlp P , 
he prefers to deliver any given number of detections d ∈ ∆ at the lowest 
cost, and so his optimal choice is 1
dp . Consequently, only monitoring pol-
icies p ∈ P1 can be implemented so that Î 1pˆ P  is a necessary condition 
for its implementation. As for sufficiency, all monitoring levels Î 1pˆ P  can 
be implemented by sufficiently rewarding the corresponding detection 
level ( )ˆ ,D p  compared with all other detection levels ¹ ( ).ˆd D p
In a next step, we analyze in more detail the set of implementable 
monitoring policies P1. First, since theorem 1 renders all p > pm nonim-
plementable, the crime level is bounded from below by F(pm). Therefore, 
P1’s upper-bound pm becomes crucial. The value of pm is determined by 
the shape of the detection function D(p), and its hump-shaped represen-
tation in Figure 2 is quite characteristic. To see this, note that it always 
holds that D(0) = 0 and D'(0) = F(0) > 0 since without monitoring there 
Figure 2. Number of detections as a function of monitoring intensity p
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are no detections (but a high crime level). Moreover, full monitoring typ-
ically also leads to few detections (D(1) = 1 - G(T)), because, given that 
every offense is detected, there are not many offenders (that is, only those 
who are undeterrable as gi > T). Thus, the maximal number of detections 
D(pm) is usually attained between these two extremes.
Second, even some p < pm might be nonimplementable, in which case 
P1 would be only a strict subset of the interval [0, pm]. This case occurs 
when D(p) is not monotonically increasing over this interval, such that 
there would exist several monitoring intensities leading to the same num-
ber of detections. By theorem 1, only the minimum of these can be imple-
mented. Otherwise, when D(p) is monotonically increasing over [0, pm], 
we have P1 = [0, pm] such that a monitoring intensity p is implementable 
if and only if p ≤ pm. The two properties discussed above—pm interior 
and D(p) monotonically increasing over [0, pm]—can be traced back to 
the distribution of gains from crime such that we obtain corollary 1.
Corollary 1. For the set of implementable monitoring policies P1, the 
following hold: 
i) Let the number of undeterrable individuals be sufficiently small such 
that it satisfies the condition 1 - G(T) < TG′(T)(> 0). Then pm is interior 
with the consequence that not all monitoring policies are implementable; 
that is, P1 ⊊ [0, 1]. 
ii) Let G be not too concave such that it satisfies the condition G′′(g) 
> -G′(g)/g (< 0) for g ∈ [0, T]. Then the number of detections D(p) is 
monotonically increasing over [0, pm] with the consequence that a desired 
monitoring intensity pˆ  is implementable if and only if £ mpˆ p ; that is, 
P1 = [0, pm]. 
Corollary 1 provides two, arguably mild, conditions that are jointly 
sufficient for the detection function to be hump shaped on its domain [0, 
1]. Both statements of corollary 1 are derived from the detection function 
D(p) = p[1 - G(pT)]. Writing the first-order condition D′(p) = 0 as
 ¢- =1 ( ) ( )G pT pTG pT  (2)
reveals the two underlying marginal effects: The term on the left-hand 
side captures the higher number of detections as the monitoring intensity 
increases (for a given crime level). The term on the right-hand side mea-
sures the marginal deterrence effect (for a given probability of detection). 
Condition i of corollary 1 ensures that there exists an interior monitor-
ing intensity p that satisfies equation  (2), that is, that balances the two 
This content downloaded from 134.021.074.169 on January 10, 2018 23:32:22 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
342 /  T H E  J O U R N A L  O F  L E G A L  S T U D I E S  /  V O L U M E  4 5  ( 2 )  /  J U N E  2 0 1 6
marginal effects. This is achieved by simply requiring that for p = 1 the 
marginal detection effect (left-hand side) is smaller than the marginal de-
terrence effect (right-hand side), which is never true for p = 0. Since by 
theorem 1 only p ≤ pm are implementable, under condition i of corollary 
1 there exist monitoring intensities that are not.14 Condition ii of corol-
lary 1 ensures that the right-hand side of equation (2) is increasing in p; 
that is, the marginal deterrence increases as monitoring becomes more 
and more intense.15 Since the left-hand side of equation (2) is always de-
creasing in p, when condition ii of corollary 1 holds, there is at most 
one monitoring intensity p that solves equation (2). This implies that the 
slope of the detection function changes its sign at most once (that is, turns 
from increasing to decreasing since D′(0) = F(0) > 0). Therefore, under 
condition ii of corollary 1, D(p) must be monotonically increasing for p 
< pm, and, hence, all of these monitoring intensities are implementable.
Remark. Theorem 1 can also be expressed in terms of the elasticity of 
crime ε(p) := -F′(p)(p/F(p)). Under conditions i and ii of corollary 1, it is 
readily derived that ε(p) ≥ 1 if and only if p ≥ pm. Thus, as a rule, inspec-
tors cannot be induced to choose a monitoring regime in the elastic range 
of the crime function. 
4. COMPARATIVE-STATICS ANALYSIS
The implications from theorem 1 depend strongly on the model’s funda-
mentals, in particular the underlying distribution of the gains from misbe-
havior G and the fine T. In this section we use comparative-statics analy-
sis to assess the impact of these two factors.
4.1. Impact of the Distribution of Gains
Different distributions of gains from crime G give rise to varying lev-
els of misbehavior, detections, and implementable monitoring intensi-
ties. We compare distributions that differ in the sense of first-order sto-
chastic dominance (FOSD). To this end, consider two distributions G 
and  ,G  where G is first-order stochastically dominated by ;G  that is, 
14. Polinsky (1980) provides further conditions that are sufficient for pm interior such 
that monitoring policies close to 1 cannot be implemented.
15. In fact, corollary  1.ii even implies that D(p) is concave. Together with corol-
lary 1.i, which guarantees that pm is interior, this ensures that D(p) is hump shaped on [0, 
1], similar to its illustration in Figure 2.
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³ ( ) ( )G g G g  for all g, with the interpretation that G  has more proba-
bility mass on high gains from crime. Denote by mp  and 1P  the respec-
tive maximizer of the number of detections and the set of implementable 
monitoring policies resulting under .G
Proposition 1. Let G be first-order stochastically dominated by .G  
i) Then, for any given monitoring intensity p, the number of detections 
and the level of misbehavior are larger under G  than under G. 
ii) Let G and G  satisfy conditions i and ii of corollary 1. If the slopes 
of G  and G at p = pm are not too distinct, then the set of implementable 
monitoring intensities is larger under G  than under G. Formally, if
 
-¢ ¢- < ³


m m
m m
m
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( 0),
G p T G p T
G p T G p T
p T
 
then > ,m mp p  and hence 1 1.P P
The two parts of proposition 1 suggest that there is a trade-off in the 
sense that facing a population with a low tendency toward misbehavior 
(as exemplified by distribution G) is on the one hand beneficial, as the 
level of misbehavior is relatively low for any given monitoring intensity p 
(proposition 1.i). But on the other hand, only a small set of (low) moni-
toring intensities is implementable, which in turn might still lead to rela-
tively high levels of misbehavior (proposition 1.ii).
How these two effects unfold is demonstrated in Figures 3–5 for two 
classes of distributions (and for T = 1): normal distributions N(µ, .5) and 
power distributions with cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) G(g) 
= gν (defined for g ∈ [0, 1]). Shown are the CDFs (Figure 3), the detection 
function D(p) (Figure 4), and the crime function F(p)  (Figure 5) for the 
different parameter values, where those distributions with higher param-
eter values of µ and ν first-order stochastically dominate those with lower 
values.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the trade-off as emerging from proposition 
1: when there is large probability mass on low realizations of g (low val-
ues of µ and ν), the overall levels of misbehavior and detections are low. 
But in addition, the value pm where the (hump-shaped) detection function 
D(p) reaches its peak is small, so that, from corollary 1, the set of imple-
mentable monitoring intensities P1 = [0, pm] is relatively small.
Shifting probability mass to higher realizations of g (that is, increasing 
µ and ν) then leads to upward shifts of both F(p) and D(p) since deter-
rence is now weaker for any level of p. As a result, pm and hence also the 
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Figure 3. Different classes of distributions: cumulative distribution functions
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Figure 4. Different classes of distributions: detections
This content downloaded from 134.021.074.169 on January 10, 2018 23:32:22 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Figure 5. Different classes of distributions: crime levels
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upper bound of the set P1 increase.16 When there are sufficiently many 
individuals with large gains from the offense, D(p) may even become 
monotonically increasing on [0, 1] as in Figure 4A, so that P1 = [0, 1], 
thereby coinciding with the choice set of the inspector. In this case, con-
dition i of corollary 1 is violated; that is, there are many undeterrable in-
dividuals, and there is no loss in terms of nonimplementable monitoring 
intensities, so that theorem 1 has no bite.
Interestingly, with respect to the resulting minimum crime level F(pm), 
the benefit from a larger choice set P1 due to a larger pm can outweigh 
the cost in the form of an upward shift of the crime function F(p). For 
example, for the case of the normal distribution with the monotonically 
increasing detection function (µ = 1.5) just discussed, there are many 
criminals who are not deterred even when monitored with the maximum 
feasible intensity p = pm = 1 (see Figures 4A and 5A). Therefore, the 
minimum crime level is F(1) = .84. In contrast, for the power distribu-
tions considered, full deterrence is in principle possible as F(1) ≡ 0 for all 
ν > 0 (see Figure 5B). However, only monitoring intensities p ∈ [0, pm] 
are implementable, and, as can be seen from Figure 4B, pm < 1 holds. 
Therefore, the minimum crime level F(pm) might well exceed that result-
ing under the monotonic case: for example, for ν = 10, we get pm = .78 
< 1, which leads to F(pm) = .91 > .84.
4.2. Varying the Fine
To investigate the impact of changes in the exogenous fine T, it is useful 
to now express explicitly, where appropriate, the dependency on T; that 
is, we now write F(p, T), D(p, T), and pm(T). Analogous to the compar-
ative statics concerning the distribution G (embodied in proposition 1), 
changes in the fine T have two countervailing effects on the set of imple-
mentable monitoring policies.
Proposition 2. Consider two fines T and T  with < .T T
i) For any given monitoring intensity p > 0, the number of detections 
and the level of misbehavior are smaller under T  than under T; that is, 
<( , ) ( , )F p T F p T  and <( , ) ( , ).D p T D p T
ii) Let G satisfy conditions i and ii of corollary 1. Then the set of im-
16. For example, consider the case ν = 1 in the power distribution, which corre-
sponds to the uniform distribution of gains over [0, 1]. Since =m 12p , the crime level is at 
least =m 12( ) .F p  Thus, when the governor wants to deter more than half of the popula-
tion (for instance, because the harm from the offense is large), then the required monitor-
ing policy > 12pˆ  cannot be implemented.
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plementable monitoring intensities is smaller under T  than under T. For-
mally,  1 1P P  because <
m m( ) ( ).p T p T
Proposition 2.i shows that an increase in T leads to a downward shift 
of F(p, T) and D(p, T), thereby unambiguously lowering both the number 
of offenses and the number of detections. Intuitively, for every given p, 
a higher fine increases the expected penalty from committing the offense 
and hence leads to fewer offenses and, as a result, fewer detections.
However, analogous to the comparative statics concerning the distri-
bution G, proposition 1.ii points to a countervailing effect in the sense 
that it leads to a smaller set of implementable monitoring intensities P1 
= [0, pm(T)]. This result is in contrast to the celebrated finding of Becker 
(1968), according to which any expected fine pT should be implemented 
with T as large as possible, as increasing T is costless (in contrast to in-
creasing p being costly). For the contexts considered here, this suggests 
that there is a reduced benefit associated with increasing T in the form 
of a shrinking set of implementable monitoring intensities. This trade-off 
is illustrated in Figure 6 for the case in which the gains from crime are 
distributed according to a standard normal distribution N(0, 1) and for 
different levels of T. As can be seen in Figure 6, low values of T give rise 
to a large set of implementable monitoring intensities (that is, pm(T) is 
large), but the resulting crime level (and the number of detections) is high. 
A higher value of T reduces the crime level, but it also reduces the set of 
monitoring intensities that can be implemented by the governor. Which 
effect dominates depends on whether pm(T)T is increasing or decreasing 
in T, which in turn depends again on the underlying distribution G. In-
terestingly, in the example of the normal distribution depicted in Figure 
6, the two effects just balance each other such that the minimum crime 
level F(pm(T), T) remains constant. For the case of power distributions, 
this property can even be shown analytically: that is, as long as pm(T) is 
interior, F(pm(T), T) is independent of T.17 This implies that, in contrast 
to standard arguments, the minimum crime level cannot be reduced by an 
increase in the fine T.
17. Indeed, consider F(p, T) = 1 - (pT)ν for pT ≤ 1. Using the first-order condition, 
we obtain pm(T) = 1/[(ν + 1)1/νT ], which is interior given that T > (1 + ν)−1/ν. Finally, 
F(pm(T), T) = 1 - [pm(T)]ν × Tν = ν/(1 + ν).
This content downloaded from 134.021.074.169 on January 10, 2018 23:32:22 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Figure 6. Effect of changes in the fine T
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5. CRIME-SENSITIVE INSPECTORS
One major implication of theorem 1 is that inspectors cannot be induced 
to choose monitoring intensities beyond the ceiling pm, which puts a 
lower bound F(pm) on the resulting crime level. We now investigate to 
what extent this result relies on the assumption maintained so far that 
inspectors care only about their remuneration and costs of effort and not 
about the level of crime itself (see equation [1]). In this section, we relax 
that assumption and allow for crime-sensitive inspectors, characterized 
by the more general utility function
 b b= - -( , ) [ ( )] ( ) ( ),u p R D p F p C p  (3)
where β measures how the inspector’s utility is affected by the presence of 
crime. Thereby, disutility (β > 0) can be caused by intrinsic motivation to 
keep the crime level low, while benefits of crime (β < 0) can arise, for ex-
ample, from accepting bribes.18 The inspector’s preferences from the basic 
model are nested as the special case β = 0 in this utility function.
As will be shown, inspectors with a sufficiently strong intrinsic moti-
vation can be induced to implement monitoring intensities p > pm, which 
are not implementable in the basic setup. However, it turns out that for 
any type of inspector, there is still a potentially large set of monitoring 
intensities that are not implementable.
To illustrate this point, we set T equal to 1 and consider quadratic 
costs of effort C(p) = cp2 for some cost parameter c > 0. Moreover, for 
the sake of analytical tractability, we focus on the case in which the gains 
from the offense are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], which corresponds 
to the special case ν = 1 for the power distributions considered in Figure 
3, leading to F(p) = 1 - p. The resulting detection function D(p) = p(1 - 
p) is then hump shaped and symmetric around =m 12p . Also, the condi-
tions of corollary 1 are satisfied, so that the set of implementable moni-
toring intensities is = 11 2[0, ]P  for an inspector who is not crime sensitive 
(β = 0). The following result characterizes this set for crime-sensitive in-
spectors (β ≠ 0).
18. The literature discusses other reasons why inspectors might worry about the pre-
vailing level of crime, for example, payments that are inversely related to the crime level 
(Garoupa and Klerman 2002) or a lower tax revenue with part accruing to the enforcer 
(Coşgel, Etkes, and Miceli 2011). In a different framework, Besanko and Spulber (1989) 
assume that an inspector can allocate a given budget between enforcement and perqui-
sites, so that the marginal rate of substitution can also be interpreted as a measure of the 
inspector’s concern about crime.
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Proposition 3. Let the distribution of gains be uniform on [0, 1] and 
T = 1 such that F(p) = 1 - p and =m 12p . Moreover, let the inspector’s 
utility function be given by equation (3) with C(p) = cp2. When the in-
spector’s disutility from crime is sufficiently high (that is, for β > c), then 
the set of implementable monitoring policies is 12[ , 1].  Otherwise (that is, 
for β < c), it is given by = 11 2[0, ].P  
The underlying intuition for the proposition is simple: any reward of-
fered for the desired number of detections ˆ( )D p  can also be gained with 
mimicking pˆ  by choosing = - ˆ1p p  instead since = ˆ( ) ( ).D p D p  It then 
depends on the inspector’s sensitivity to crime β, in relation to the costs 
of monitoring, whether the higher or the lower monitoring intensity is 
preferred. In the knife-edge case of β = c, the inspector is indifferent be-
tween each pair of monitoring intensities that lead to the same number of 
detections.
Proposition 3 suggests that inspectors can be distinguished with respect 
to their β type as follows: For bad types (β < c), the intrinsic motivation 
for curbing crime is low, and we are back to the setting underlying the-
orem 1, which renders monitoring intensities p > pm nonimplementable. 
The resulting crime level tends to be high (that is, larger than F(pm)), and 
detected offenders should hence be classified as scapegoats.
In contrast, for good types (β > c), the intrinsic motivation is suf-
ficiently high such that they can be induced to choose high monitoring 
intensities. In this case, the number of offenses is low, and the detected 
offenders should rather be classified as black sheep. Notice, however, that 
in this case, a mirror result of theorem 1 applies in the sense that only 
monitoring intensities p ≥ pm can be implemented, and lower ones can-
not.
6. LINEAR REWARD SCHEMES
The inspector’s degree of intrinsic motivation also crucially determines 
his behavioral response to changes in the reward scheme R[D(p)]. We il-
lustrate this effect by considering simple linear payment schemes in which 
for each detection the inspector receives a predefined reward (or bounty) 
r; that is, R[D(p)] = rD(p). This specification of payments is employed in 
the literature on delegated (private) enforcement (see, for example, Becker 
and Stigler 1974; Landes and Posner 1975; Polinsky 1980; Besanko and 
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Spulber 1989). The inspector’s optimal monitoring policy p*(r, β) then 
satisfies
 b bÎÎ - -[0, 1]*( , ) arg max ( ) ( ) ( ).pp r rD p F p C p  
Keeping the parameterizations of Section 5, this leads to the following 
result:
Proposition 4. Let the distribution of gains be uniform on [0, 1] and 
T = 1 such that F(p) = 1 - p, and let the inspector’s utility function be 
given by equation (3) with C(p) = cp2. If R[D(p)] = rD(p) with r not too 
small (that is, r ≥ max{-β, β - 2c}), then 
i) the inspector’s optimal monitoring policy is given by p*(r, β) = (r + 
β)/2(r + c), which is increasing in β, and 
ii) an increase in the reward r leads bad (good) types to optimally 
choose a higher (lower) monitoring intensity; that is, ∂p*(r, β)/∂r > 0 ⇔ 
β < c and ∂p*(r, β)/∂r < 0 ⇔ β > c. 
As for proposition 4.i, more intrinsic motivation to curb crime β leads 
to a higher level of monitoring effort.19 Thereby, b > =m 12*( , )p r p  if 
and only if β > c, so that indeed each type optimally chooses a moni-
toring intensity from the set of implementable ones as characterized in 
proposition 3.
Proposition 4.ii reveals that the responses of the two types of inspec-
tors to changes in the bounty r are quite different: For bad types (β < c), 
starting at the lower bound r = -β we have p*(r, β) = 0, and the mon-
itoring intensity increases as r increases, approaching b = 12*( , )p r  from 
the left in the limiting case r → ∞.20 In this case, higher monetary rewards 
have the standard effect of increasing the monitoring intensity, generating 
more detections, and thereby lowering the number of offenses.21
19. In the framework of Coşgel, Etkes, and Miceli (2011), the inspector chooses a 
higher level of effort when he benefits from a lower level of crime in the form of higher 
taxation income.
20. This is shown formally at the end of the proof of proposition 4; see also Garoupa 
and Klerman (2002).
21. In the context of corporate criminal liability considered in Arlen (1994), a firm is 
required to monitor its employees, and because of vicarious liability, it is liable for crimes 
committed by them. Liability is triggered (only) when a crime is detected by the firm so 
that, similar to our framework, the introduction of vicarious liability (which can be in-
terpreted as a negative bounty for each detection) may in fact decrease the firm’s optimal 
monitoring intensity.
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In contrast, for good types (β > c), p*(r, β) is decreasing in the reward 
r, starting at the lower bound r = β - 2c, where p*(r, β) = 1 and ap-
proaches b = 12*( , )p r  from the right as r increases. Note that these types 
also respond by generating more detections when the marginal benefit r 
of doing so increases. However, they achieve more detections by reducing 
their monitoring intensity, which leads to more offenses. This result is in 
line with the literature on motivational crowding out in the sense that the 
inspector’s monitoring effort is lower the stronger the monetary incen-
tives (see, for example, Deci 1971; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999; Frey 
and Jegen 2001; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011). In our framework, 
however, this effect is not due to the fact that such incentives directly 
reduce the inspector’s degree of intrinsic motivation, for example, in the 
sense of turning a noneconomic relationship into an economic one (see, 
for example, Titmuss 1970; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Gneezy and 
Rustichini 2000a, 2000b). Rather, for inspectors with a high degree of 
intrinsic motivation, generating more detections requires a lower moni-
toring effort, thereby also leading to more offenses.
The dependence of the inspector’s response to monetary rewards on his 
degree of intrinsic motivation to keep the crime level low has further con-
sequences: for example, in order to implement some desired monitoring in-
tensity > 12ˆ ,p  the corresponding bounty is b b= - -ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( 2 )/(2 1),r p pc p  
which is always positive when the inspector’s intrinsic motivation is suf-
ficiently strong (that is, for β > 2c), but b <ˆ( , ) 0r p  (that is, a payment 
from the inspector to the governor for each detection) is also possible. 
This occurs for good types with intermediate degrees of intrinsic motiva-
tion (c < β < 2c) and when b>ˆ *(0, )p p , that is, when pˆ  exceeds the 
monitoring intensity chosen by the inspector under intrinsic motivation 
alone (r = 0). In that case, the inspector needs to be punished by a nega-
tive bounty in order to increase his effort.
One can also relax the assumption that the fine is fixed at T = 1 and 
explore how changes in T affect the per-detection reward necessary to in-
duce a given implementable monitoring intensity as optimally chosen by 
the inspector. For r such that the inspector’s choice is interior, we have
b b= - -ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ) (2 )/(1 2 ).r p T cp T Tp  For the case of purely monetary in-
centives (β = 0), this is increasing in T so that higher fines induce higher 
per-detection rewards. With crime-sensitive inspectors (β ≠ 0), however, 
the sign of the effect is ambiguous. Taking the derivative with respect to 
T reveals that it delicately depends on the parametrization of the model 
This content downloaded from 134.021.074.169 on January 10, 2018 23:32:22 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
354 /  T H E  J O U R N A L  O F  L E G A L  S T U D I E S  /  V O L U M E  4 5  ( 2 )  /  J U N E  2 0 1 6
whether rewarding the inspector for detections becomes more or less 
costly for the governor as the fine increases.22
All in all, our findings suggest that payment schemes based on the 
number of detections such as bounties are delicate instruments that are 
sensitive to the inspector’s concern for keeping the crime level low. In 
particular, ignoring an inspector’s intrinsic motivation might lead to se-
verely misguided incentives.
7. SOCIAL WELFARE
So far, the analysis has focused on the implementability of a desired mon-
itoring intensity ˆ( )p  that is assumed to be exogenously given. In this sec-
tion we relax this assumption and derive pˆ  endogenously as the solution 
to a maximization problem of the governor who can be considered a so-
cial planner. This provides us with an efficiency benchmark against which 
we then compare our results for implementability. In this respect, the un-
derlying social welfare function contains the following elements. First, let 
the society’s harm from crime be hF(p), where h > 0 is a constant harm 
from each offense. Furthermore, from the inspector’s payoff function (see 
equation [3]), we include the inspector’s enforcement costs C(p) and his 
disutility from crime βF(p), while the remuneration R[D(p)] is a transfer 
payment between the governor and the inspector, which cancels. More-
over, the offenders’ gains from the offense are typically included (see, for 
example, Polinsky and Shavell 2007), but this is not an uncontroversial 
issue (see, for example, Stigler 1970). For this reason, we use a general 
specification that nests both possibilities as special cases, so that social 
welfare is given by
 b p
¥
¢= - + ´ - + ´òSW( ) : ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
pT
p h F p C p g G q dq,  (4)
where the parameter π ∈ [0, 1] reflects the weight that the social planner 
puts on the offenders’ gains from the offense.23
22. A special case of a linear reward occurs when the inspector keeps the collected 
fines; that is, r = T. If interior, the optimal monitoring intensity is then given by p(β, T) 
= (1 + β)T/(2T 2 + 2c), which is hump shaped in T where the maximum is attained at 
= .T c  Hence, for fines beyond this threshold, a higher fine (that is, a higher reward per 
detection) would induce the inspector to choose a lower monitoring intensity.
23. The special case π = 0 is consistent with an alternative interpretation. If the in-
spector has an outside option of 0 and the governor chooses the reward to satisfy the in-
spector’s participation constraint, then R[D(p)] = βF(p) - C(p), such that the governor’s 
payoff coincides with social welfare defined in equation (4), when setting π equal to 0.
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Throughout, we continue with the uniform-quadratic specification; 
that is, the gains from the offense are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], T = 
1 (so that F(p) = 1 - p and =m 12p ) and C(p) = cp2. The desired moni-
toring intensity pˆ  can thus be defined as maximizing the following social 
welfare function:
 
p b
Î
é ù
ê ú= = - + - - -ê úë û
2
[0, 1]
ˆ arg max SW( ) (1 ) (1 ) .
2p
p p p p h cp  (5)
It is easily seen that social welfare is always strictly concave in p and, 
given that h + β > 0, also strictly increasing at p = 0 such that the 
welfare optimum either is attained at the boundary =ˆ( 1),p  which here 
leads to full deterrence, or is interior.24 In the latter case, it solves the 
first-order condition ¢ =ˆSW ( ) 0p  and is given by
 b
p
+=
+
ˆ .
2
h
p
c
 (6)
Hence, the efficient (interior) monitoring intensity increases as offenses 
become more detrimental for the society (h), when the inspector becomes 
more crime sensitive (β), as the gains from the offense receive less weight 
in the social welfare function (π), and when the cost of monitoring de-
creases (c).
In a next step, we compare the efficiency benchmark with our previ-
ous findings concerning implementability (in particular, theorem 1 and 
proposition 3). This leads to the following result:
Proposition 5. Let social welfare be given by equation (5) so that the 
resulting socially optimal monitoring intensity is ˆ.p
i) When the inspector’s crime sensitivity is low (β < c; bad type), pˆ  
is implementable if and only if the harm from the offenses is sufficiently 
small; that is, h ≤ c - β + π/2. Otherwise, underenforcement arises. 
ii) When the inspector’s crime sensitivity is high (β > c; good type), pˆ  
is implementable if and only if the harm from the offenses is sufficiently 
large; that is, h ≥ c - β + π/2. Otherwise, overenforcement arises. 
The proposition can be illustrated using the taxonomy presented in 
Table 1. Thereby, p* denotes the (privately) optimal monitoring intensity 
24. The socially optimal monitoring intensity is interior for sufficiently large costs of 
monitoring. More precisely, given that h + β > 0, pˆ  is interior if and only if c > (h + 
β - π)/2.
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chosen by the inspector for a given reward scheme R[D(p)]; that is, p* 
maximizes the inspector’s payoff as given in equation (3).25
As for proposition 5.i, bad types exhibit a low intrinsic motivation 
to curb crime such that only p* from the set [0, pm] can be implemented 
(see proposition 3). If the level of social harm from crime is sufficiently 
low, the welfare-maximizing monitoring intensity pˆ  also belongs to this 
set and hence becomes implementable. For example, it can be shown that 
by setting a bounty bp p b= - - - +ˆ [ ( /2)]/[( /2) ],r ch h c  the gover-
nor indeed induces the inspector to choose = ˆ*p p.26 For greater harm 
from crime, £ <m ˆ*p p p  holds, which implies that underenforcement is 
inevitable.
Analogously, in proposition 5.ii the inspector’s intrinsic motivation 
level is high, so that only high monitoring intensities p* ∈ [pm, 1] can be 
implemented (see proposition 3). Hence, the welfare-maximizing moni-
toring intensity also belongs to this set only when the harm from crime 
is sufficiently high such that > mpˆ p  holds. For low levels of harm from 
crime, overenforcement arises since < £mˆ *.p p p  Note that the condi-
tions for overenforcement require that h < π/2 (since we must have β + 
h - (π/2) < c < β), so that overenforcement can occur only when the 
offenders’ gains from the offense also enter the social welfare function (π 
> 0).
25. Note that there typically exist several reward schemes that lead to the same p. For 
example, in the proofs of theorem 1 and proposition 3, we consider a simple discontinu-
ous reward scheme. But it can be shown that, except for pm (where the detection function 
D(p) reaches its hump), all implementable monitoring policies can also be reached with a 
linear reward scheme, as discussed in Section 6.
26. Importantly, in our model there are no restrictions on the feasible transfers be-
tween the governor and the inspector (for example, due to limited liability). This implies 
that in our setup there is no issue with additional distortions because of a trade-off be-
tween rent and efficiency, which arises in many agency models (see, for example, Laffont 
and Martimort 2002) and would affect the possible implementability of pˆ  even on the 
diagonal of Table 1.
Table 1. Privately Optimal versus Efficient Monitoring Intensities
Low Harm from Crime:
pb< - +
2
h c
High Harm from Crime:
pb> - +
2
h c
Low sensitivity to crime: β < c p*, £ˆ mp p £ < ˆ* mp p p
Implementable Underenforcement
High sensitivity to crime: β > c < £ˆ *mp p p p*, ³ˆ mp p
Overenforcement Implementable
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In terms of this taxonomy, one could argue that the previous literature 
(see, for example, Polinsky 1980; Garoupa and Klerman 2002; Coşgel, 
Etkes, and Miceli 2011) confines attention to the cases with low sensitiv-
ity to crime in Table 1, while we also analyze the cases with high sensi-
tivity to crime.27 We consider both of these novel cases to be empirically 
relevant. Intrinsic motivation might be one explanation why in many sit-
uations where the desired level of monitoring intensity is high there is 
no issue of implementability, although an inspector’s shirking would not 
reduce his payments. And intrinsic motivation can cause overenforcement 
when the governor’s desired monitoring level is low, for example, in the 
case of minor offenses that are fully deterred by an overly motivated in-
spector.
In general, our analysis points to some degree of congruity of the in-
spector’s crime sensitivity (β) and the social harm from crime (h), which 
is required in order to make the efficient monitoring intensity imple-
mentable. This is satisfied on the diagonal of Table 1. Hence, when the 
level of harm is high, inspectors with strong intrinsic motivation are so-
cially desirable in order to overcome the underenforcement issue. In con-
trast, when the level of harm from crime is low, inspectors with low levels 
of intrinsic motivation seem better suited since they do not overenforce.28
It is also interesting to investigate how a change in the fine T would 
affect these results. While a full analysis is beyond the scope of the paper, 
it is clear that the following effects need to be taken into account. First, 
as shown in proposition 2, the monitoring intensity for which the number 
of detections is maximized becomes smaller as the fine increases (that is, 
pm(T) is decreasing in T), which shrinks the set of implementable monitor-
ing intensities for inspectors with low levels of intrinsic motivation (bad 
27. Indeed, propositions 1 and 5 in Polinsky (1980) refer to high crime and under-
enforcement; Garoupa and Klerman (2002) show that there is a linear reward scheme 
(bounty) that implements a desired monitoring policy under low levels of harm but not 
high levels of harm; and Coşgel, Etkes, and Miceli (2011) introduce an inspector’s crime 
sensitivity by the right to collect taxes, but they do not explore the possibility that the 
disutility from crime is strong enough that the lower cells become relevant.
28. The optimal alignment of preferences in principal-agent settings with delegation 
is also discussed in contexts other than law enforcement. For instance, Bubb and Warren 
(2014) study a principal’s optimal delegation decision when agents differ with respect to 
how strongly they care about the social costs and benefits from a regulatory policy such 
as environmental protection. They show that it is typically not optimal for the principal 
to select an unbiased agent (that is, one with the same preferences as the principal with 
respect to the policy). The reason is that biased agents might have a stronger incentive to 
engage in information acquisition about new regulatory opportunities.
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types). Second, a higher fine changes the threshold for the classification as 
either bad or good types (now the condition is β ≶ c/T 2 instead of β ≶ c). 
Third, the fine also affects the welfare-maximizing (interior) monitoring 
intensity b p= + +2ˆ [ ( )]/( 2 )p T h T c ,  which is increasing in T as long as 
the weight of the gains from the offenses in the social welfare function 
(π) is not too large. Taken together, whether a higher fine increases the 
scope of implementability of pˆ  or instead fosters underenforcement or 
overenforcement is generally ambiguous and depends on the underlying 
distributional assumptions as well as on the model’s other parameters. 
For any given fine, however, one can distinguish cases analogous to those 
in Table 1 and obtain the corresponding implementability results.
8. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on delegated monitoring in 
which only the number of detections, and not the underlying monitoring 
intensity or the level of misbehavior, can be observed by the delegating 
authority (governor). This literature points to a problem of underenforce-
ment in the sense that the first-best monitoring intensity need not be im-
plementable. The reason is that when several monitoring intensities are 
observationally identical (that is, give rise to the same number of detec-
tions), the inspector to which the monitoring task is delegated can typi-
cally be induced to choose only the minimum of these. This also imposes 
a lower bound on the resulting crime level.
We first generalize the results from the previous literature and charac-
terize the full set of implementable monitoring policies. We then perform 
a comparative-statics analysis to study how the set of implementable 
monitoring intensities varies with changes in the distribution of gains 
from the offense and in the fine. This set is small for low benefits from 
crime or high fines. In particular, the largest monitoring policy that is 
implementable decreases with the fine such that deterrence need not be 
increasing in the fine.
We then consider an extension of the model in which the utility of 
inspectors is directly influenced by the number of offenses in the popula-
tion. In this respect, we believe that the intrinsic motivation to keep the 
level of crime low is an empirically relevant (and commonly neglected) 
factor. We first show that low levels of intrinsic motivation do not qual-
itatively affect the findings from the baseline model, and still only rel-
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atively low monitoring intensities can be implemented. However, when 
the degree of intrinsic motivation is sufficiently large, a mirror result pre-
vails, and the set of implementable policies is bounded from below in-
stead. Consequently, either the desired monitoring policy is large enough 
to be implementable or overenforcement occurs; that is, for any payment 
scheme, the inspector will choose a monitoring intensity that is larger 
than the one the governor wants to implement.
Our results also suggest that when inspectors are crime sensitive (for 
example, because of intrinsic motivation), incentive schemes such as 
bounties as often discussed in the related literature might be even more 
delicate instruments than previously thought. The reason is that it cru-
cially depends on the inspector’s degree of intrinsic motivation whether 
such extrinsic incentives tend to reinforce the monitoring incentives gen-
erated by intrinsic motivation or crowd them out.
Our analysis, hence, points to the potentially crucial role of the de-
gree of intrinsic motivation in the context of delegated monitoring, 
which, however, will typically be unobservable for governors. Therefore, 
an interesting extension of the model would be a screening framework 
in which the governor can offer different pairs of monitoring intensities 
bˆ( )p  and payments bˆ( ),R  depending on the inspector’s reported type bˆ  
(which does not necessarily coincide with his true type β). In contrast to 
standard screening models, the resulting design problem for the governor 
becomes significantly more intricate because of additional incentive con-
straints. This is due to the fundamental property of this setting in which 
multiple monitoring intensities give rise to the same number of detections, 
which increases the scope of mimicking. A full analysis of such an ex-
tended screening framework is, however, beyond the scope of the present 
paper. From a more practical point of view, one possibility for learning 
about an inspector’s intrinsic motivation over time would be to exploit 
the different comparative-statics properties of agents with different de-
grees of intrinsic motivation. For example, if it is possible to manipulate 
the costs of monitoring, then good types can be separated from bad types 
since the number of detections increases in only one of the two cases.
Finally, our analysis also sheds light on which contexts of delegated 
monitoring are more prone to issues such as under- or overenforcement 
and the ensuing consequences. In this respect, note that our framework 
applies not only to the arena of law and economics but in principle also 
to other settings of monitoring such as enforcing safety and ethical stan-
dards in the manufacturing industry or hygienic standards in the food 
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industry. Another relevant context is education, where a school authority 
delegates the task of educating pupils to schools and teachers. In doing 
so, it is an outsider in the sense that it can typically observe only which 
grades are awarded in a school. However, it does not observe whether, 
for instance, good grades are due to the fact that the school, its teach-
ers, and the pupils are all hard working or whether they are the result 
of a (tacit) agreement among these parties to grade leniently. As a result, 
looking only at grades might not be very informative about the level of 
education of pupils or the quality of schools. In this context, however, by 
featuring state- or nationwide tests that all pupils must take, it seems that 
authorities have successfully implemented institutional changes to ame-
liorate the problem that schools of different quality might be observation-
ally identical.29 Even though such or similar measures might not always 
be available in the contexts to which our framework applies, our analysis 
nevertheless clearly points to the beneficial role of institutional changes 
that help authorities overcome their outsider status.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
A1. Proof of Theorem 1
For Ï 1ˆ ,p P  there is a Î 1p P  such that = ˆ( ) ( )D p D p  by definition of P1. Noting that 
= ˆ[ ( )] [ ( )]R D p R D p  while < ˆ( ) ( )C p C p , it follows that > ˆ( ) ( )u p u p , which shows 
that pˆ  cannot be implemented. Now, suppose that Î 1ˆ .p P  Let e+= 1( ) ( )
dR d C p  
if = =ˆ ˆ: ( )d d D p  and R(d) = 0 otherwise. Then e= >ˆ( ) 0,u p  while for small 
enough ε we have u(p) ≤ 0 for all ¹ ˆp p because other monitoring intensities p  
that lead to the same number of detections (that is, Î dˆp P ) are associated with 
higher costs, and all other choices (that is, Ï dˆp P ) do not lead to any reward.
For the second statement, note that continuous G renders F continuous and 
thus renders D continuous as well. Since D(p) starts with D(0) = 0 and reaches its 
global maximum for the first time at pm, D(p) attains every value of its image ∆ in 
the interval [0, pm]. Thus, for any d ∈ ∆, Î m1 [0, ].dp p
A2. Proof of Proposition 1
Consider two distributions G and G, where G is first-order stochastically domi-
nated by G;  that is, ³ ( ) ( )G g G g  for all g. Denote by ( )F p  and ( )D p  the respective 
functions resulting under .G
i) For all p ∈ [0, 1], we have
29. In Germany, for example, many states recently introduced mandatory statewide 
tests in German, English, and mathematics.
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Figure A1. Marginal deterrence and detection effects for distributions G and G
 = - £ - = ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( )F p G pT G pT F p  
and
 = - £ - = ( ) [1 ( )] [1 ( )] ( ).D p p G pT p G pT D p  
ii) Under corollary  1.i, pm and mp  are characterized by the first-order con-
ditions 1 - G(pT) = pTG′(pT) and ¢- = 1 ( ) ( ).G pT pTG pT  By corollary  1.ii, 
the right-hand sides of both equations are increasing in p. The left-hand sides 
of both equations are decreasing in p such that pm and mp  are the only inter-
sections. This is illustrated in Figure  A1 (while the FOSD always implies that 
- ³ -1 ( ) 1 ( ),G pT G pT  the relation of the two right-hand sides is ambiguous). 
Observe that ³m mp p  if and only if ¢- ³ m m m1 ( ) ( ).G p T p TG p T
 
The assumption 
¢ ¢- < - m m m m m( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]/( )G p T G p T G p T G p T p T  is equivalent to
 
=
¢ ¢- > + - - 

m m m m m m
0
1 ( ) ( ) [1 ( )] ( ),G p T p TG p T G p T p TG p T  (A1)
which yields the result. Q.E.D.
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A3. Proof of Proposition 2
To show the assertions for two fines T and T ,  we determine the slopes of the rel-
evant functions.
i) For all p ∈ (0, 1], we have
 ¶ ¢= - <
¶
( , )
( ) 0
F p T
pG pT
T
 
and
 
¶ ¢= - <
¶
2( , ) ( ) 0.
D p T
p G pT
T
 
ii) By corollary 1.i, pm(T) is interior. Using the implicit-function theorem, we 
have
 
/é ù¶ ¶ ¶ê ú= -ê ú¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ë û
¢ ¢¢+= -
¢ ¢¢+
m 2 2
2
m m m 2 m
m m 2 m
( ) ( , ) ( , )
2 ( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) [ ( ) ]
.
2 [ ( ) ] ( ) [ ( ) ]
p T D p T D p T
T p T p
p T G p T T p T TG p T T
TG p T T p T T G p T T
 
By corollary 1.ii, D(p, T) is concave, and thus the denominator is negative (this 
also follows from the second-order condition for pm(T) to maximize D(p, T)). Ob-
serve that the negative sign of the denominator is equivalent to G′′[pm(T)T] < 
-2G′[pm(T)T]/[pm(T)T], which is also equivalent to the numerator being negative. 
Taken together, the expression is negative since the fraction after the minus sign 
is positive. Q.E.D.
A4. Proof of Proposition 3
For C(p) = cp2 and F(p) = 1 - p, the inspector’s optimization problem is 
maxp R[p(1 - p)] - β(1 - p) - cp2. Consider some desired monitoring intensity 
pˆ and let = - ˆ: 1 .p p  Noting that - = - ˆ ˆ[ (1 )] [ (1 )],R p p R p p  we obtain ³ ˆ( ) ( )u p u p  
if and only if b - ³ -ˆ ˆ(2 1) (2 1).p c p
Suppose that β > c. Then > ˆ( ) ( )u p u p  if and only if > 1
2
pˆ  such that any de-
sired intensity < 1
2
pˆ  is strictly worse than = - ˆ1 .p p  Now, let R(d) = x > β + 
c if = =ˆ ˆ: ( )d d D p  and R(d) = 0 otherwise. Then, choosing x large enough, for 
example, x = β + c, yields b b= - - - > - - -2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) (1 ) 0 (1 )u p x p cp p cp  for any 
¹ ˆ, .p p p  The case β < c is fully analogous. Q.E.D.
A5. Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that the crime function is F(p) = 1 - p and the inspector’s utility is given 
by equation (3). If every detection is rewarded with some bounty r, the inspector’s 
optimization problem becomes
 bÎ - - - -
2
[0, 1]
max (1 ) (1 ) .
p
rp p p cp  
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An interior solution is characterized by the first-order condition p*(r, β) = (r + 
β)/2(r + c), which is the first part of the proposition. The second part follows di-
rectly from
 
b b¶ -=
¶ + 2
*( , )
,
2( )
p r c
r r c  
given, again, that the solution is interior.
An interior solution is obtained if r ≥ max{-c, -β, β - 2c}, where the first 
condition is equivalent to concavity of the maximization problem, while the sec-
ond and the third conditions assure that the function is increasing at the boundary 
p = 0 and decreasing at the boundary p = 1. To show that r ≥ max{-β, β - 2c} 
is sufficient for an interior solution p*(r, β) and for the sake of completeness, we 
formally provide the optimal monitoring policies for all possible types.
First, for β < c (bad types), we have -β > -c > β - 2c. Thus, the optimal 
behavior is
 
b b
b
b
+
+
ìï ³ -ï= íï < -ïî
2( ) if*( , ) .
0 if
r
r c rp r
r
 
For r = -β, the inspector chooses p* = 0, and for growing r, = 12*p  is ap-
proached from the left.
Second, for β > c (good types), we have β - 2c > -c > -β. Thus, the optimal 
behavior is
 
b b
b
b
+
+
ìï ³ -ï= íï < -ïî
2( ) if 2*( , ) .
1 if 2
r
r c r cp r
r c
 
For r = β - 2c, the inspector chooses p* = 1, and for growing r, = 12*p  is ap-
proached from the right.
Third, for the nongeneric case β = c, we have -β = −c = β - 2c. Then the 
optimal behavior is
 
b b
b b
b
+
+
ìï = > -ïïï= < -íïïï = -ïïî
1
2( ) 2 if
*( , ) {0, 1} if .
[0, 1] if
r
r c r
p r r
r
 
For r = -β the inspector is indifferent between all choices, for larger r he maxi-
mizes the number of detections, and for smaller r he minimizes them. Q.E.D.
A6. Proof of Proposition 5
We first establish that the monitoring intensity pˆ  that maximizes equation  (4) 
satisfies
 pb³ = Û ³ - +m 1ˆ .
2 2
p p h c  (A2)
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If maximizing equation (4) yields an interior solution, then the condition above 
follows from a simple rearrangement of the first-order condition provided by 
equation (6). Otherwise, maximizing equation (4) either yields the boundary solu-
tion =ˆ 0p  for h + β < 0, which implies that h < c - β + π/2, or yields the 
boundary solution =ˆ 1p  for h + β ≥ 0 and c < (h + β - π)/2, which implies that 
h > 2c - β + π > c - β + π/2. This shows the first assertion.
i) By proposition 3, β < c implies that any p is implementable if and only if p ∈ 
P1 = [0, pm]. Hence, pˆ  is implementable if and only if £
mpˆ p , which is satisfied if 
and only if h ≤ c - β + π/2. Otherwise, we have h > c - β + π/2, which implies 
that > mpˆ p , while only p ≤ pm is implementable.
ii) By proposition 3, β > c implies that any p is implementable if and only if 
p ∈ [pm, 1]. Hence, pˆ  is implementable if and only if ³ mpˆ p , which is satisfied if 
and only if h ≥ c - β + π/2. Otherwise, we have h < c - β + π/2, which implies 
that < mpˆ p , while only p ≥ pm is implementable. Q.E.D.
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